

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A TRIPLE DIVISION IN DEMOSTHENES

Hermogenes points out that Demosthenes uses more often than any other a style that he calls Abundance (περιβολή) (290).¹ According to Hermogenes, Demosthenes always wanted to give his speeches dignity and grandeur, and of those styles that can do this, only Abundance can be used almost everywhere (289). One of the figures that produce Abundance is “division” (μερισμός). A division involves dividing a complete thought into its component parts (238). In Greek this is usually accomplished, of course, by the use of μέν and δέ. This construction creates Abundance, generally defined by Hermogenes as adding anything that is not absolutely necessary to the thought (278), first because the speaker adds extraneous structure. However, he also injects an element of suspense since the μέν clause necessarily causes the reader or hearer to wonder what the δέ clause will involve. As Hermogenes says (287), “Figures that produce Abundance are, first of all, those that imply a second thought or even a third one.”²

Divisions within divisions make the passage “full” (292), which Hermogenes defines as abundant Abundance (291). Fullness, in general, “is created whenever figures that create Abundance are used in conjunction with one another,”³ in this case a division used in conjunction with another division. This usually takes the form of a “double division,” that is, dividing one element that makes up the dominant division, as is clear from Hermogenes’ examples (292). The first sentence of Demosthenes’ *First Philippic* is typical. He begins with a division: “If (Εἰ μέν) it were now being proposed, gentlemen of Athens, to speak about some new matter . . .” However, before giving the δέ clause that corresponds to the μέν clause, Demosthenes inserts another division: “if (εἰ μέν) anything said by them had pleased me, I would keep silent, but if not (εἰ δὲ μή) then I myself would attempt to say what I think.” Then he gives the clause that responds to the first one in the sentence: ἐπειδὴ δ’.⁴

There is, however, in the proemium to the *Third Philippic* an unusually elaborate and complex sentence that involves a triple division, the only such sentence that I

1. All references to Hermogenes are to pages in the edition by Rabe (Leipzig, 1913).

2. Quoted from the translation by C. W. Wooten, *Hermogenes’ “On Types of Style”* (Chapel Hill, 1987), 47.

3. Quoted from Wooten, “*On Types of Style*” (note 2 above), 52.

4. The inserted μέν/δέ exemplifies other figures that Hermogenes associates with Abundance. First of all, there is the figure that involves defining something by affirming and denying it (κατὰ ἄρσιν καὶ θέσιν; 293). Here Demosthenes could have easily omitted the δέ clause, thus creating what Hermogenes calls an unfinished or incomplete division (μερισμός ἀπόλυτος, 362), with no detriment to clarify. However, he chooses to state it fully. Secondly, there is a fictitious supposition, another extraneous element, and, as Hermogenes says: “Figures that involve fictitious suppositions also imply other thoughts, especially if the supposition is cast in the form of a division” (quoted from Wooten, “*On Types of Style*,” 48). I will deal later in this paper with the question of why Demosthenes would open a speech with such an elaborate and complex sentence.

know of in Demosthenes.⁵ In this remarkable sentence, which uses three pairs of μέν/δέ clauses, each δέ clause is itself divided into μέν/δέ clauses. I quote the sentence before discussing it (*Third Philippic* [2]):

πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶν αἰτία τούτων, καὶ οὐ παρ' ἐν οὐδὲ δὴ εἰς τοῦτο τὰ πράγματα ἀφίκται, μάλιστα δ', ἄνπερ ἐξετάζητ' ὀρθῶς, εὐρήσετε διὰ τοὺς χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν προαιρουμένους, ὧν τινες μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ δύνανται, ταῦτα φυλάττοντες οὐδεμίαν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων πρόνοιαν ἔχουσιν, οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ὑμᾶς οἴονται δεῖν ἔχειν ἕτεροι δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὄντας αἰτιώμενοι καὶ διαβάλλοντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἢ ὅπως ἡ μὲν πόλις αὐτῇ παρ' αὐτῆς δίκην λήψεται καὶ περὶ τοῦτ' ἔσται, Φιλίππῳ δ' ἐξέσται καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ὅ τι βούλεται.

This looks like an unusually complex sentence. However, there are, as I hope to show below, several informing principles that make it easier to follow and allow it to emphasize what Demosthenes wants to highlight. First of all, the δέ clause in each pair is the more important of the two and contains information to which Demosthenes wants to call attention. This creates a pattern, planted clearly in the mind of the hearer, which is similar to a metronome in which the click to the right is louder and longer than that to the left.

This emphasis is achieved partially by simple length. The δέ clause, since it is itself divided into a μέν/δέ construction, is necessarily weightier and more complex than the μέν clause with which it is paired. One sees this clearly simply by counting syllables. The first μέν clause contains 29 syllables. The δέ clause corresponding to it, when one counts the μέν/δέ clauses into which it is itself divided, has 127. Likewise, the second μέν clause has 57 syllables, contrasted with the δέ clause, again counting the μέν/δέ clauses that follow, which has 71. Moreover, in each μέν clause there are delaying devices that create suspense whose primary purpose seems to be to emphasize the more important δέ clause which in each case is more specific than the μέν clause with which it is paired. In fact, this steady progression from the general to the specific, as from the less to the more important, is another of the informing principles that Demosthenes uses to control this sentence.⁶ This creates a spiralling effect by which as the thought becomes more precise and more significant the clauses become more expansive.

In the first pair, for example, the μέν clause is very general: πολλὰ . . . ἐστὶν αἰτία τούτων. The second half of this clause really says the same thing, using the figure that involves expressing negatively what has already been stated positively (see note 4 above): καὶ οὐ . . . ἀφίκται. Now, one of the purposes of this sort of repetition, which Hermogenes sees as being typical of an abundant style (284–86), can be to create emphasis simply by repeating an idea. And this is surely, to some extent, the case here. By restating a thought Demosthenes drives it home and gives the hearer the impression that he is well prepared to receive the next stage of the argument. He thus ensures that his audience is ready for the important information that follows. However, repetition can also be used to create suspense, and to delay, and

5. This complexity is typical of the proemium of the entire speech. Blass notes that “Das Prooemium dieser grossen Rede erscheint ungewöhnlich ausgedehnt.” F. Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, 2d ed., vol. 3, bk. 1 (Leipzig, 1893), 375. In his appendix (612) Blass breaks the sentence down into cola. I follow his divisions.

6. This type of movement is typical, in fact, of Demosthenes' periods as a whole; see G. Rowe, “Demosthenes' Use of Language,” in *Demosthenes' “On the Crown,”* ed. J. J. Murphy (New York, 1967), 191–92.

thus emphasize, what follows. Here it seems to me to have primarily that function. The δέ clause contains much more precise information (μάλιστα δ'). Even here, however, Demosthenes delays what he wants to emphasize, and thus calls attention to it, since the inserted ἀνπερ ἐξετάζητ' ὀρθῶς is hardly necessary to the thought. The crucial idea begins with the εὐρήσετε. The τοὺς in διὰ τοὺς that follows arouses our expectation, since we expect a participle or a noun in the accusative case to be used with it. This does not come until six words later when we get the προαιρουμένων. Thus, by bracketing the phrase in this way, Demosthenes pulls the audience's attention along until the end. Having delayed this important idea, which he sees as being at the heart of Athens' problems,⁷ Demosthenes picks up the pace when he gets to it in order to give it emphasis. This pattern, as we will see, is typical of this sentence.

Thus, we see in the first μέν/δέ pair devices that emphasize the idea in the δέ clause. The same pattern appears in the second pair. The τινες are broken down into two groups. The first try to preserve a political situation in which they themselves are powerful and take no forethought for the future.⁸ But then Demosthenes adds, at least in the longer version of the speech,⁹ the fairly obvious idea: οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ὑμᾶς οἶονται δεῖν ἔχειν. I say that this is fairly obvious because in a democracy it is quite clear that politicians will try to convince the people to think as they do. On the one hand, Demosthenes is here employing an emotional argument, trying to alienate the people from their current leaders, by depicting these politicians as having a low opinion of the people and trying to prevent them from taking precautions for the future. However, it seems to me that the main stylistic purpose of this clause is something like padding, to delay the δέ clause that follows. This deals with Demosthenes' political opponents, such as Aeschines, whom he sees as traitors and the ultimate source of Athens' problems.¹⁰ In addition to containing thought that is fairly obvious, the clause is also very slow, with 10 of its 11 syllables being long.¹¹ Demosthenes is clearly holding back the δέ clause.

The speed of the more important δέ clause that follows is much quicker. Of the first 11 syllables, 7 are short.¹² Having slowed down the sentence to create suspense Demosthenes now rushes to its conclusion. The phrase introduced by τοὺς arouses an expectation for ὄντας. But then Demosthenes slows the thought down again with the fairly synonymous doublet αἰτιώμενοι καὶ διαβάλλοντες, again delaying in order to create suspense so that he can emphasize the conclusion. But when that conclusion comes, it says nothing: οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν. Our expectations have been foiled.

7. The idea that Athenian politicians are an integral part of Athens' problems is quite prominent in this speech; cf. 4, 6, 47, 63–64. It should be noted that it is typical of public speakers who are not in power to blame those who are for current problems and to portray them as being more concerned for their own welfare than for that of the state; cf. Aeschin. 3.130–51.

8. This probably refers to politicians like Eubulus; see N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford, 1967), 545–46.

9. On the longer and shorter versions of this speech see Lionel Pearson, *The Art of Demosthenes* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1976; reprint, Chico, CA, 1981), 150–52.

10. Cf. other discussions of this idea in this speech: 1, 9, 14, 36–46, 53–62, 65–66.

11. I would like to thank Mary McElwee for calling my attention to this.

12. Even here, however, Demosthenes does not violate the tendency, first noted by Blass (105), to avoid more than two short syllables in a row. This tendency gives a weighty quality to all of Demosthenes' prose; however, the preceding colon, with ten long syllables out of eleven, is particularly heavy. For the metrical configurations normally found in Demosthenes see D. F. McCabe, *The Prose-Rhythm of Demosthenes* (New York, 1981), 122.

We must wait for the important final μέν/δέ pair, contained in the ὅπως clause, to find out exactly what they do.

In this final pair the μέν clause once again uses the delaying device that we have seen before: The second half really says the same thing as the first (ἡ μὲν πόλις . . . ἔσται). In other words, Demosthenes is once again simply delaying the δέ clause that contains the ultimate problem that this speech addresses: Philip can do and say whatever he pleases. Demosthenes manages to emphasize this clause in several ways. First, as I have pointed out, he delays it. Secondly, he here breaks the pattern that he has set up in the rest of the sentence because this final δέ clause, the most important, is shorter than the μέν clause with which it is paired (20 syllables as opposed to 17) and, unlike the other δέ clauses, is not itself divided. This foils our expectations and thus focuses our attention on the clause, which seems abrupt. Thirdly, in the rest of the sentence the speed varies. It holds back or lunges forward. Here, however, the flow is steady and sure. Fourthly, the very simplicity of the clause calls attention to itself. Every other clause contains within itself synonymity, subordination, or hyperbaton (e.g., ἐν οἷς . . . ταῦτα). This clause is plain and stark. In other words, as Demosthenes presents the situation, causes may be complex and complicated, but the result that they produce is plain for all to see.

This brings me to the final informing principle that I want to note in this sentence. Demosthenes has moved steadily from general causes (πολλὰ μὲν) to particular causes (μάλιστα δ') and finally to results (ὅπως). He has built up a pattern that emphasizes particular causes rather than general, traitors rather than complacent politicians, and Philip's freedom of action rather than the bickering among the Athenians. καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ὅ τι βούλεται is the most important phrase in this sentence because, as Demosthenes says later in the speech (22), this is ὑπὲρ οὗ τὸν ἄλλον ἅπαντα χρόνον πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γεγονάσιν οἱ Ἕλληνικοί. This speech is a call to war. What better way to try to arouse the Athenians than by showing that Philip now holds a power that the Greeks have never allowed to anyone before?

Why, however, would Demosthenes use a sentence apparently as complex as this one in the proemium to a speech before a large audience? (Recall that the first sentence in the *First Philippic* contains a double division.) Did he not run the risk of losing his audience at the outset? First of all, as I hope to have demonstrated, the sentence is not nearly so complicated as it seems on first reading because of the complete control that Demosthenes exerts over it and the organizing principles that inform it. Demosthenes' architectural approach keeps the sentence from becoming unwieldy and guides the listener or reader through it. Secondly, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus points out (*Dem.* 15), Demosthenes did not want to use a plain, simple style because he feared that that would make his topic appear too trivial and mundane and would offend the better educated members of this audience. On the other hand, a truly grand style, such as one finds, according to Dionysius, in Thucydides or Gorgias, would probably not be comprehensible to many members of his audience. Therefore, he opted for a style that is in between, far enough removed from everyday speech to dignify his topic, but clear enough to be understandable to all members of his audience. This is particularly important at the very outset of the speech, as here, since this is where the audience will get their first and, consequently, most important impression of the orator himself and the situation that he is discussing. Demosthenes achieves this balance, as the sentence discussed here

demonstrates so admirably, by using an elaborate structure informed by clear organizing principles. Here, as often in Demosthenes, the medium reflects the message.¹³ Form clearly reflects content: The situation is complex but what is most important can be easily understood. The form of the sentence also contributes to the ethical appeal of the orator. Although political affairs are complicated, Demosthenes is the kind of man who can sort them out and present them clearly.¹⁴

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13. For other examples of sentences in Demosthenes where form clearly reflects content see C. W. Wooten, "A Few Observations on Form and Content in Demosthenes," *Phoenix* 31 (1977): 258–61 and the appendix to Wooten, "On Types of Style," 134–36.

14. I would like to thank the two anonymous readers and Professor Galen Rowe for their very helpful comments on this note.

PROPERTIUS 2.23 AND ITS FINAL COUPLET (23–24)

The final couplet of Propertius 2.23 has lived adventurously, having been accused of tautology, repunctuated to make line 23 part of the previous sentence, deleted, transposed both internally and externally, stigmatized as a "Schlussinterpolation," and emended in various ways,¹ with consequences, major or minor, for the elegy as a whole. In O the couplet reads (23–24):

libertas quoniam nulli iam restat amanti
 nullus liber erit si quis amare volet

Only two defenses of the unrepunctuated *paradosis* have been attempted: one of them, Thörnell (1932), 355–57, usefully refers to part of *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 36, where Cicero makes the same ironic transition as Propertius from *servitium amoris*² to real *servitium* in a passage that clarifies the contemporary philosophico-cultural background to Propertius' couplet.³ But Thörnell's explanations-cum-justifications of O's text—*libertas* (23) as "in universum est 'liberum arbitrium'" and *liber* (24) as "quasi ex iure Quiritium dicitur pro ingenuo"—are linguistically incorrect: *libertas* here is simply (abstract) "freedom," and *liber* "free," as opposed to "enslaved."

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1. For details of most of these interventions, cf. Enk 1962, ad loc.; Smyth 1970, 62; Shackleton Bailey 1956, 109; Scheidweiler 1960, 78–79; Hanslik 1979, 76; Hendry 1996; Günther 1997, p. 120, n. 251, p. 155. Heubner 1965, 348 turns the couplet into a question.

2. Of the two more recent treatments of *servitium amoris*, Lyne 1979 is poorly documented on the Greek side and argues for the erroneous conclusion that "the inventor of the Elegiac 'servitium amoris' is probably Propertius himself" (129). For a fuller and more judicious account of the topic, cf. Murgatroyd 1981.

3. Also noted by Enk 1962, ad loc.; Lyne 1979, p. 123, n. 4; and Hendry 1996, p. 443, n. 14. Its importance justifies quotation: "an ille mihi liber, cui mulier imperat, cui leges imponit, praescribit iubet vetat quod videtur, qui nihil imperanti negare potest, nihil recusare audent? poscit, dandum est; vocat, veniendum est; eicit, abeundum; minatur, extimescendum, ego vero istum non modo servum sed nequissimum servum, etiamsi in amplissima familia natus sit, appellandum puto."